Driver: Remove legacy encryption algorithms.

There is probably some followup cleanup which can be done, but keeping
the general structure intact might help if there are future changes on
available (non-E2EE) algorithms.
This commit is contained in:
Kyle Simpson
2025-02-21 16:02:16 +00:00
parent 47cf0b27eb
commit f05b262dfe
8 changed files with 44 additions and 273 deletions

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ audiopus = { optional = true, version = "0.3.0-rc.0" }
byteorder = { optional = true, version = "1" }
bytes = { optional = true, version = "1" }
chacha20poly1305 = { optional = true, version = "0.10.1" }
crypto_secretbox = { optional = true, features = ["std"], version = "0.1" }
crypto-common = { optional = true, features = ["std"], version = "0.1" }
dashmap = { optional = true, version = "6.1.0" }
derivative = "2"
discortp = { default-features = false, features = [
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ driver = [
"dep:byteorder",
"dep:bytes",
"dep:chacha20poly1305",
"dep:crypto_secretbox",
"dep:crypto-common",
"dep:discortp",
"dep:flume",
"dep:nohash-hasher",

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use crate::{
driver::tasks::{error::Recipient, message::*},
ws::Error as WsError,
};
use crypto_secretbox::Error as CryptoError;
use aes_gcm::Error as CryptoError;
use flume::SendError;
use serde_json::Error as JsonError;
use std::{error::Error as StdError, fmt, io::Error as IoError};
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ impl StdError for Error {
fn source(&self) -> Option<&(dyn StdError + 'static)> {
match self {
Error::AttemptDiscarded
| Error::Crypto(_)
| Error::CryptoInvalidLength
| Error::CryptoModeInvalid
| Error::CryptoModeUnavailable
@@ -127,7 +128,6 @@ impl StdError for Error {
| Error::InterconnectFailure(_)
| Error::Ws(_)
| Error::TimedOut => None,
Error::Crypto(e) => e.source(),
Error::Io(e) => e.source(),
Error::Json(e) => e.source(),
}

View File

@@ -2,25 +2,24 @@
#[cfg(any(feature = "receive", test))]
use super::tasks::error::Error as InternalError;
use aead::AeadCore;
use aes_gcm::{AeadInPlace, Aes256Gcm, KeyInit};
use aes_gcm::{AeadInPlace, Aes256Gcm, Error as CryptoError};
use byteorder::{NetworkEndian, WriteBytesExt};
use chacha20poly1305::XChaCha20Poly1305;
use crypto_secretbox::{cipher::InvalidLength, Error as CryptoError, XSalsa20Poly1305};
use crypto_common::{InvalidLength, KeyInit};
#[cfg(feature = "receive")]
use discortp::rtcp::MutableRtcpPacket;
use discortp::{rtp::RtpPacket, MutablePacket};
use discortp::MutablePacket;
#[cfg(any(feature = "receive", test))]
use discortp::{
rtp::{MutableRtpPacket, RtpExtensionPacket},
Packet,
};
use rand::Rng;
use std::{num::Wrapping, str::FromStr};
use typenum::Unsigned;
use crate::error::ConnectionError;
/// Variants of the `XSalsa20Poly1305` encryption scheme.
/// Encryption schemes supportd by Discord.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Default, Hash)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum CryptoMode {
@@ -47,45 +46,11 @@ pub enum CryptoMode {
///
/// Nonce width of 4B (32b), at an extra 4B per packet (~0.2 kB/s).
XChaCha20Poly1305,
#[deprecated(
since = "0.4.4",
note = "This voice encryption mode will no longer be accepted by Discord\
as of 2024-11-18. This variant will be removed in `v0.5`."
)]
/// The RTP header is used as the source of nonce bytes for the packet.
///
/// Equivalent to a nonce of at most 48b (6B) at no extra packet overhead:
/// the RTP sequence number and timestamp are the varying quantities.
Normal,
#[deprecated(
since = "0.4.4",
note = "This voice encryption mode will no longer be accepted by Discord\
as of 2024-11-18. This variant will be removed in `v0.5`."
)]
/// An additional random 24B suffix is used as the source of nonce bytes for the packet.
/// This is regenerated randomly for each packet.
///
/// Full nonce width of 24B (192b), at an extra 24B per packet (~1.2 kB/s).
Suffix,
#[deprecated(
since = "0.4.4",
note = "This voice encryption mode will no longer be accepted by Discord\
as of 2024-11-18. This variant will be removed in `v0.5`."
)]
/// An additional random 4B suffix is used as the source of nonce bytes for the packet.
/// This nonce value increments by `1` with each packet.
///
/// Nonce width of 4B (32b), at an extra 4B per packet (~0.2 kB/s).
Lite,
}
#[allow(deprecated)]
impl From<CryptoState> for CryptoMode {
fn from(val: CryptoState) -> Self {
match val {
CryptoState::Normal => Self::Normal,
CryptoState::Suffix => Self::Suffix,
CryptoState::Lite(_) => Self::Lite,
CryptoState::Aes256Gcm(_) => Self::Aes256Gcm,
CryptoState::XChaCha20Poly1305(_) => Self::XChaCha20Poly1305,
}
@@ -99,20 +64,15 @@ pub struct UnrecognisedCryptoMode;
impl FromStr for CryptoMode {
type Err = UnrecognisedCryptoMode;
#[allow(deprecated)]
fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
match s {
"aead_aes256_gcm_rtpsize" => Ok(Self::Aes256Gcm),
"aead_xchacha20_poly1305_rtpsize" => Ok(Self::XChaCha20Poly1305),
"xsalsa20_poly1305" => Ok(Self::Normal),
"xsalsa20_poly1305_suffix" => Ok(Self::Suffix),
"xsalsa20_poly1305_lite" => Ok(Self::Lite),
_ => Err(UnrecognisedCryptoMode),
}
}
}
#[allow(deprecated)]
impl CryptoMode {
/// Returns the underlying crypto algorithm used by a given [`CryptoMode`].
#[must_use]
@@ -120,22 +80,6 @@ impl CryptoMode {
match self {
CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm => EncryptionAlgorithm::Aes256Gcm,
CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305 => EncryptionAlgorithm::XChaCha20Poly1305,
CryptoMode::Normal | CryptoMode::Suffix | CryptoMode::Lite =>
EncryptionAlgorithm::XSalsa20Poly1305,
}
}
/// Returns whether this [`CryptoMode`] dynamically sizes the ciphertext region
/// to begin in the middle of RTP extensions.
///
/// Compliant SRTP would leave all extensions in cleartext, hence 'more' SRTP
/// compliant.
#[must_use]
#[cfg(any(feature = "receive", test))]
pub(crate) const fn is_more_srtp_compliant(self) -> bool {
match self {
CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm | CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305 => true,
CryptoMode::Normal | CryptoMode::Suffix | CryptoMode::Lite => false,
}
}
@@ -149,8 +93,6 @@ impl CryptoMode {
.map(Cipher::Aes256Gcm),
EncryptionAlgorithm::XChaCha20Poly1305 =>
XChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(key).map(Cipher::XChaCha20Poly1305),
EncryptionAlgorithm::XSalsa20Poly1305 =>
XSalsa20Poly1305::new_from_slice(key).map(|v| Cipher::XSalsa20Poly1305(v, self)),
}
}
@@ -160,11 +102,8 @@ impl CryptoMode {
#[must_use]
pub(crate) fn priority(self) -> u64 {
match self {
CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm => 4,
CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305 => 3,
CryptoMode::Normal => 2,
CryptoMode::Suffix => 1,
CryptoMode::Lite => 0,
CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm => 1,
CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305 => 0,
}
}
@@ -213,9 +152,6 @@ impl CryptoMode {
#[must_use]
pub const fn to_request_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::Normal => "xsalsa20_poly1305",
Self::Suffix => "xsalsa20_poly1305_suffix",
Self::Lite => "xsalsa20_poly1305_lite",
Self::Aes256Gcm => "aead_aes256_gcm_rtpsize",
Self::XChaCha20Poly1305 => "aead_xchacha20_poly1305_rtpsize",
}
@@ -226,7 +162,6 @@ impl CryptoMode {
pub const fn algorithm_nonce_size(self) -> usize {
use typenum::Unsigned as _;
match self {
Self::Lite | Self::Normal | Self::Suffix => XSalsa20Poly1305::NONCE_SIZE,
Self::XChaCha20Poly1305 => <XChaCha20Poly1305 as AeadCore>::NonceSize::USIZE, // => 24
Self::Aes256Gcm => <Aes256Gcm as AeadCore>::NonceSize::USIZE, // => 12
}
@@ -237,35 +172,18 @@ impl CryptoMode {
#[must_use]
pub const fn nonce_size(self) -> usize {
match self {
Self::Aes256Gcm | Self::XChaCha20Poly1305 | Self::Lite => 4,
Self::Normal => RtpPacket::minimum_packet_size(),
Self::Suffix => XSalsa20Poly1305::NONCE_SIZE,
Self::Aes256Gcm | Self::XChaCha20Poly1305 => 4,
}
}
/// Returns the number of bytes occupied by the XSalsa20Poly1305
/// encryption schemes which fall before the payload.
#[must_use]
#[deprecated(
since = "0.4.4",
note = "This method returns the fixed payload prefix for older encryption modes,\
which will no longer be accepted by Discord as of 2024-11-18. It is an\
implementation detail and will be removed in `v0.5`."
)]
pub fn payload_prefix_len() -> usize {
XSalsa20Poly1305::TAG_SIZE
}
/// Returns the number of bytes occupied by the encryption scheme
/// which fall before the payload.
///
/// Method name duplicated until v0.5, to prevent breaking change.
#[must_use]
pub(crate) const fn payload_prefix_len2(self) -> usize {
pub(crate) const fn payload_prefix_len(self) -> usize {
match self {
CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm | CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305 => 0,
CryptoMode::Normal | CryptoMode::Suffix | CryptoMode::Lite =>
XSalsa20Poly1305::TAG_SIZE,
}
}
@@ -279,41 +197,32 @@ impl CryptoMode {
/// which fall after the payload.
#[must_use]
pub const fn payload_suffix_len(self) -> usize {
match self {
Self::Normal => 0,
Self::Suffix | Self::Lite => self.nonce_size(),
Self::Aes256Gcm | Self::XChaCha20Poly1305 =>
self.nonce_size() + self.encryption_tag_len(),
}
self.nonce_size() + self.encryption_tag_len()
}
/// Returns the number of bytes occupied by an encryption scheme's tag which
/// fall *after* the payload.
#[must_use]
pub const fn tag_suffix_len(self) -> usize {
match self {
Self::Normal | Self::Suffix | Self::Lite => 0,
Self::Aes256Gcm | Self::XChaCha20Poly1305 => self.encryption_tag_len(),
}
self.encryption_tag_len()
}
/// Calculates the number of additional bytes required compared
/// to an unencrypted payload.
#[must_use]
pub const fn payload_overhead(self) -> usize {
self.payload_prefix_len2() + self.payload_suffix_len()
self.payload_prefix_len() + self.payload_suffix_len()
}
/// Extracts the byte slice in a packet used as the nonce, and the remaining mutable
/// portion of the packet.
fn nonce_slice<'a>(
self,
header: &'a [u8],
_header: &'a [u8],
body: &'a mut [u8],
) -> Result<(&'a [u8], &'a mut [u8]), CryptoError> {
match self {
Self::Normal => Ok((header, body)),
Self::Suffix | Self::Lite | Self::Aes256Gcm | Self::XChaCha20Poly1305 => {
Self::Aes256Gcm | Self::XChaCha20Poly1305 => {
let len = body.len();
if len < self.payload_suffix_len() {
Err(CryptoError)
@@ -324,47 +233,6 @@ impl CryptoMode {
},
}
}
/// Encrypts a Discord RT(C)P packet using the given XSalsa20Poly1305 cipher.
///
/// Use of this requires that the input packet has had a nonce generated in the correct location,
/// and `payload_len` specifies the number of bytes after the header including this nonce.
#[deprecated(
since = "0.4.4",
note = "This method performs encryption for older encryption modes,\
which will no longer be accepted by Discord as of 2024-11-18. It is an\
implementation detail and will be removed in `v0.5`."
)]
#[inline]
pub fn encrypt_in_place(
self,
packet: &mut impl MutablePacket,
cipher: &XSalsa20Poly1305,
payload_len: usize,
) -> Result<(), CryptoError> {
let header_len = packet.packet().len() - packet.payload().len();
let (header, body) = packet.packet_mut().split_at_mut(header_len);
let (slice_to_use, body_remaining) = self.nonce_slice(header, &mut body[..payload_len])?;
let nonce_size = self.nonce_size();
let tag_size = self.encryption_tag_len();
let mut nonce = crypto_secretbox::Nonce::default();
let nonce_slice = if slice_to_use.len() == nonce_size {
crypto_secretbox::Nonce::from_slice(&slice_to_use[..nonce_size])
} else {
nonce[..slice_to_use.len()].copy_from_slice(slice_to_use);
&nonce
};
// body_remaining is now correctly truncated by this point.
// the true_payload to encrypt follows after the first TAG_LEN bytes.
let tag =
cipher.encrypt_in_place_detached(nonce_slice, b"", &mut body_remaining[tag_size..])?;
body_remaining[..tag_size].copy_from_slice(&tag[..]);
Ok(())
}
}
/// State used in nonce generation for the encryption variants in [`CryptoMode`].
@@ -381,29 +249,11 @@ pub enum CryptoState {
///
/// The last used nonce is stored.
XChaCha20Poly1305(Wrapping<u32>),
/// The RTP header is used as the source of nonce bytes for the packet.
///
/// No state is required.
Normal,
/// An additional random 24B suffix is used as the source of nonce bytes for the packet.
/// This is regenerated randomly for each packet.
///
/// No state is required.
Suffix,
/// An additional random 4B suffix is used as the source of nonce bytes for the packet.
/// This nonce value increments by `1` with each packet.
///
/// The last used nonce is stored.
Lite(Wrapping<u32>),
}
#[allow(deprecated)]
impl From<CryptoMode> for CryptoState {
fn from(val: CryptoMode) -> Self {
match val {
CryptoMode::Normal => CryptoState::Normal,
CryptoMode::Suffix => CryptoState::Suffix,
CryptoMode::Lite => CryptoState::Lite(Wrapping(rand::random::<u32>())),
CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm => CryptoState::Aes256Gcm(Wrapping(rand::random::<u32>())),
CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305 =>
CryptoState::XChaCha20Poly1305(Wrapping(rand::random::<u32>())),
@@ -423,12 +273,7 @@ impl CryptoState {
let startpoint = endpoint - mode.nonce_size();
match self {
Self::Suffix => {
rand::rng().fill(&mut packet.payload_mut()[startpoint..endpoint]);
},
Self::Lite(ref mut i)
| Self::Aes256Gcm(ref mut i)
| Self::XChaCha20Poly1305(ref mut i) => {
Self::Aes256Gcm(ref mut i) | Self::XChaCha20Poly1305(ref mut i) => {
(&mut packet.payload_mut()[startpoint..endpoint])
.write_u32::<NetworkEndian>(i.0)
.expect(
@@ -436,7 +281,6 @@ impl CryptoState {
);
*i += Wrapping(1);
},
Self::Normal => {},
}
endpoint
@@ -453,7 +297,6 @@ impl CryptoState {
pub(crate) enum EncryptionAlgorithm {
Aes256Gcm,
XChaCha20Poly1305,
XSalsa20Poly1305,
}
impl EncryptionAlgorithm {
@@ -462,7 +305,6 @@ impl EncryptionAlgorithm {
match self {
Self::Aes256Gcm => <Aes256Gcm as AeadCore>::TagSize::USIZE, // 16
Self::XChaCha20Poly1305 => <XChaCha20Poly1305 as AeadCore>::TagSize::USIZE, // 16
Self::XSalsa20Poly1305 => XSalsa20Poly1305::TAG_SIZE, // 16
}
}
}
@@ -470,7 +312,6 @@ impl EncryptionAlgorithm {
impl From<&Cipher> for EncryptionAlgorithm {
fn from(value: &Cipher) -> Self {
match value {
Cipher::XSalsa20Poly1305(..) => EncryptionAlgorithm::XSalsa20Poly1305,
Cipher::XChaCha20Poly1305(_) => EncryptionAlgorithm::XChaCha20Poly1305,
Cipher::Aes256Gcm(_) => EncryptionAlgorithm::Aes256Gcm,
}
@@ -479,7 +320,6 @@ impl From<&Cipher> for EncryptionAlgorithm {
#[derive(Clone)]
pub enum Cipher {
XSalsa20Poly1305(XSalsa20Poly1305, CryptoMode),
XChaCha20Poly1305(XChaCha20Poly1305),
Aes256Gcm(Box<Aes256Gcm>),
}
@@ -488,7 +328,6 @@ impl Cipher {
#[must_use]
pub(crate) fn mode(&self) -> CryptoMode {
match self {
Cipher::XSalsa20Poly1305(_, mode) => *mode,
Cipher::XChaCha20Poly1305(_) => CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305,
Cipher::Aes256Gcm(_) => CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm,
}
@@ -519,23 +358,13 @@ impl Cipher {
// body_remaining is now correctly truncated to exclude the nonce by this point.
// the true_payload to encrypt is within the buf[prefix:-suffix].
let (pre_payload, body_remaining) = body_remaining.split_at_mut(mode.payload_prefix_len2());
let (_, body_remaining) = body_remaining.split_at_mut(mode.payload_prefix_len());
let (body, post_payload) =
body_remaining.split_at_mut(body_remaining.len() - mode.tag_suffix_len());
// All these Nonce types are distinct at the type level
// (96b for AES, 192b for XSalsa/XChaCha).
// (96b for AES, 192b for XChaCha).
match self {
// Older modes place the tag before the payload and do not authenticate
// cleartext.
Self::XSalsa20Poly1305(secret_box, _) => {
let mut nonce = crypto_secretbox::Nonce::default();
nonce[..mode.nonce_size()].copy_from_slice(slice_to_use);
let tag = secret_box.encrypt_in_place_detached(&nonce, b"", body)?;
pre_payload[..tag_size].copy_from_slice(&tag[..]);
},
// The below variants follow part of the SRTP spec (RFC3711, sec 3.1)
// by requiring that we include the cleartext header portion as
// authenticated data.
@@ -563,14 +392,13 @@ impl Cipher {
&self,
packet: &mut MutableRtpPacket<'_>,
) -> Result<(usize, usize), InternalError> {
let mode = self.mode();
// An exciting difference from the SRTP spec: Discord begins encryption
// after the RTP extension *header*, encrypting the extensions themselves,
// whereas the spec leaves all extensions in the clear.
// This header is described as the 'extension preamble'.
let has_extension = packet.get_extension() != 0;
let plain_bytes = if mode.is_more_srtp_compliant() && has_extension {
let plain_bytes = if has_extension {
// CSRCs and extension bytes will be in the plaintext segment.
// We will need these demarcated to select the right bytes to
// decrypt, and to use as auth data.
@@ -624,7 +452,7 @@ impl Cipher {
let (slice_to_use, body_remaining) = mode.nonce_slice(plaintext, ciphertext)?;
let (pre_payload, body_remaining) =
split_at_mut_checked(body_remaining, mode.payload_prefix_len2()).ok_or(CryptoError)?;
split_at_mut_checked(body_remaining, mode.payload_prefix_len()).ok_or(CryptoError)?;
let suffix_split_point = body_remaining
.len()
@@ -637,16 +465,6 @@ impl Cipher {
let tag_size = self.encryption_tag_len();
match self {
// Older modes place the tag before the payload and do not authenticate
// cleartext.
Self::XSalsa20Poly1305(secret_box, _) => {
let mut nonce = crypto_secretbox::Nonce::default();
nonce[..mode.nonce_size().min(slice_to_use.len())].copy_from_slice(slice_to_use);
let tag = crypto_secretbox::Tag::from_slice(&pre_payload[..tag_size]);
secret_box.decrypt_in_place_detached(&nonce, b"", body, tag)?;
},
// The below variants follow part of the SRTP spec (RFC3711, sec 3.1)
// by requiring that we include the cleartext header portion as
// authenticated data.
@@ -700,16 +518,10 @@ mod test {
use discortp::rtp::MutableRtpPacket;
#[test]
#[allow(deprecated)]
fn small_packet_decrypts_error() {
let mut buf = [0u8; MutableRtpPacket::minimum_packet_size()];
let modes = [
CryptoMode::Normal,
CryptoMode::Suffix,
CryptoMode::Lite,
CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm,
CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305,
];
let modes = [CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm, CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305];
let mut pkt = MutableRtpPacket::new(&mut buf[..]).unwrap();
for mode in modes {
@@ -720,41 +532,6 @@ mod test {
}
}
#[test]
#[allow(deprecated)]
fn symmetric_encrypt_decrypt_xsalsa20() {
const TRUE_PAYLOAD: [u8; 8] = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8];
let mut buf = [0u8; MutableRtpPacket::minimum_packet_size()
+ TRUE_PAYLOAD.len()
+ XSalsa20Poly1305::TAG_SIZE
+ XSalsa20Poly1305::NONCE_SIZE];
let modes = [CryptoMode::Normal, CryptoMode::Lite, CryptoMode::Suffix];
for mode in modes {
buf.fill(0);
let cipher = mode
.cipher_from_key(&[7u8; XSalsa20Poly1305::KEY_SIZE])
.unwrap();
let mut pkt = MutableRtpPacket::new(&mut buf[..]).unwrap();
let mut crypto_state = CryptoState::from(mode);
let payload = pkt.payload_mut();
payload[XSalsa20Poly1305::TAG_SIZE..XSalsa20Poly1305::TAG_SIZE + TRUE_PAYLOAD.len()]
.copy_from_slice(&TRUE_PAYLOAD[..]);
let final_payload_size = crypto_state
.write_packet_nonce(&mut pkt, XSalsa20Poly1305::TAG_SIZE + TRUE_PAYLOAD.len());
let enc_succ = cipher.encrypt_pkt_in_place(&mut pkt, final_payload_size);
assert!(enc_succ.is_ok());
let final_pkt_len = MutableRtpPacket::minimum_packet_size() + final_payload_size;
let mut pkt = MutableRtpPacket::new(&mut buf[..final_pkt_len]).unwrap();
assert!(cipher.decrypt_rtp_in_place(&mut pkt).is_ok());
}
}
#[test]
fn symmetric_encrypt_decrypt_tag_after_data() {
const TRUE_PAYLOAD: [u8; 8] = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8];
@@ -772,7 +549,7 @@ mod test {
let mut pkt = MutableRtpPacket::new(&mut buf[..]).unwrap();
let mut crypto_state = CryptoState::from(mode);
let payload = pkt.payload_mut();
payload[mode.payload_prefix_len2()..TRUE_PAYLOAD.len()].copy_from_slice(&TRUE_PAYLOAD);
payload[mode.payload_prefix_len()..TRUE_PAYLOAD.len()].copy_from_slice(&TRUE_PAYLOAD);
let final_payload_size = crypto_state.write_packet_nonce(&mut pkt, TRUE_PAYLOAD.len());
@@ -788,28 +565,26 @@ mod test {
}
#[test]
#[allow(deprecated)]
fn negotiate_cryptomode() {
// If we have no preference (or our preference is missing), choose the highest available in the set.
let test_set = [
CryptoMode::Suffix,
CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305,
CryptoMode::Lite,
]
.map(CryptoMode::to_request_str);
let test_set =
[CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305, CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm].map(CryptoMode::to_request_str);
assert_eq!(
CryptoMode::negotiate(test_set, None).unwrap(),
CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305
CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm
);
let test_set_missing = [CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305].map(CryptoMode::to_request_str);
assert_eq!(
CryptoMode::negotiate(test_set, Some(CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm)).unwrap(),
CryptoMode::negotiate(test_set_missing, Some(CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm)).unwrap(),
CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305
);
// Preference wins in spite of the defined `priority` value.
assert_eq!(
CryptoMode::negotiate(test_set, Some(CryptoMode::Suffix)).unwrap(),
CryptoMode::Suffix
CryptoMode::negotiate(test_set, Some(CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305)).unwrap(),
CryptoMode::XChaCha20Poly1305
);
// If there is no mutual intelligibility, return an error.

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
use super::message::*;
use crate::ws::Error as WsError;
use aes_gcm::Error as CryptoError;
use audiopus::Error as OpusError;
use crypto_secretbox::aead::Error as CryptoError;
use flume::SendError;
use std::io::{Error as IoError, ErrorKind as IoErrorKind};

View File

@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ impl Mixer {
);
let payload = rtp.payload_mut();
let pre_len = self.crypto_mode().payload_prefix_len2();
let pre_len = self.crypto_mode().payload_prefix_len();
payload[pre_len..pre_len + SILENT_FRAME.len()].copy_from_slice(&SILENT_FRAME[..]);
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ impl Mixer {
);
let payload = rtp.payload();
let opus_frame =
(payload[self.crypto_mode().payload_prefix_len2()..][..len]).to_vec();
(payload[self.crypto_mode().payload_prefix_len()..][..len]).to_vec();
OutputMessage::Passthrough(opus_frame)
},
@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ impl Mixer {
let payload = rtp.payload_mut();
let crypto_mode = conn.crypto_state.kind();
let first_payload_byte = crypto_mode.payload_prefix_len2();
let first_payload_byte = crypto_mode.payload_prefix_len();
// If passthrough, Opus payload in place already.
// Else encode into buffer with space for AEAD encryption headers.
@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ impl Mixer {
(Blame: VOICE_PACKET_MAX?)",
);
let payload = rtp.payload_mut();
let opus_frame = &mut payload[self.crypto_mode().payload_prefix_len2()..];
let opus_frame = &mut payload[self.crypto_mode().payload_prefix_len()..];
// Opus frame passthrough.
// This requires that we have only one PLAYING track, who has volume 1.0, and an

View File

@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ impl UdpRx {
let rtp = rtp.to_immutable();
let (rtp_body_start, rtp_body_tail, decrypted) = packet_data.unwrap_or_else(|| {
(
crypto_mode.payload_prefix_len2(),
crypto_mode.payload_prefix_len(),
crypto_mode.payload_suffix_len(),
false,
)
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ impl UdpRx {
let (start, tail) = packet_data.unwrap_or_else(|| {
(
crypto_mode.payload_prefix_len2(),
crypto_mode.payload_prefix_len(),
crypto_mode.payload_suffix_len(),
)
});

View File

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ impl SsrcState {
let extensions = rtp.get_extension() != 0;
let payload = rtp.payload();
let payload_offset = self.crypto_mode.payload_prefix_len2();
let payload_offset = self.crypto_mode.payload_prefix_len();
let payload_end_pad = payload.len() - self.crypto_mode.payload_suffix_len();
// We still need to compute missed packets here in case of long loss chains or similar.

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ use crate::{
test_utils,
tracks::LoopState,
};
use crypto_secretbox::XSalsa20Poly1305;
use flume::Receiver;
use std::{io::Cursor, net::UdpSocket, sync::Arc};
use tokio::runtime::Handle;
@@ -63,11 +62,8 @@ impl Mixer {
.connect("127.0.0.1:5316")
.expect("Failed to connect to local dest port.");
#[allow(deprecated)]
let mode = CryptoMode::Normal;
let cipher = mode
.cipher_from_key(&[0u8; XSalsa20Poly1305::KEY_SIZE])
.unwrap();
let mode = CryptoMode::Aes256Gcm;
let cipher = mode.cipher_from_key(&[0u8; 32]).unwrap();
let crypto_state = mode.into();
#[cfg(feature = "receive")]